Ki Jeong-jin is the one of the most famous Neo-Confucian theorists of the late Joseon Dynasty, and he is well known as a proposer of the theory of statements that there is only one Principle although the phenomena vary. He particularly emphasizes the role and authority of Principle. His arguments related to the theory were mainly raised in the work of Napryangsaeui. He, in this work, explicitly reveals the intention to resolve the issues of the nature of humans and things (...) in the Ho-hak debate. But he has never directly participated in the debate. Instead, after his death, some debates over Napryangsaeui arose between his students and Jeon Woo. This paper aims to analyze Ki Jeong-jin’s theory by comparison with the view of Han Wonjin who represents the theory of nature of humans and things in the Ho-hak school, and with the issues of debate between Ki Jeong-jin’s students and Jeon Woo. Particularly, we focused on the matter of relation between ‘completeness and incompleteness’ and ‘original nature’. Through this analysis, we could expand the understanding of the aspects discussed in the theory on the similarities and differences in nature of humans and things, and the significance of Ki Jeong-jin’s theory. Furthermore, in the history of Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty, we could shed light on the reconstruction process of the philosophical statements that there is only one Principle but the phenomena vary. (shrink)

1. An Tŏng-mun ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏse pangsik -- 2. An Tŏng-mun ŭi Samsan Sŏwŏn wisang chŏngnip kwa kŭ ŭimi -- 3. Ha Ik-pŏm ŭi sam kwa munhak -- 4. Pak Ch'i-bok ŭi Nammyŏnghak kyesŭng yangsang -- 5. Kang Pyŏng-ju ŭi hangmun kwa munhak -- 6. Chŏng Chae-gyu ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa 'Taehak' haesŏk -- 7. Kim Chin-ho ŭi haksŏl e taehayŏ -- 8. Kwak Chong-sŏk ŭi Myŏngdŏksŏl nonjaeng -- 9. Kim Hwang ŭi Kyŏnghak Sipto e taehayŏ.

Study on the works of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, 1899-1938, Urdu and Persian poet with special reference to his philosophy of self and self-identity; contributed articles presented at a seminar.

Study on the works of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, 1899-1938, Urdu and Persian poet with special reference to his philosophy of self and self-identity; contributed articles presented at a seminar.

Hier geht es um eine Auseinandersetzung mit Nicolai Hartmann unter dem Aspekt der Nächsten- und der Fernstenliebe. Der Autor kritisiert Hartmanns Auffassung der Nächstenliebe (für Hartmann Jenseits-Eudämo- nismus) und Fernstenliebe (für Hartmann Idealbild) und plädiert für eine Erweiterung des christlichen Begriffs des Nächsten und der Nächstenliebe, die vor allem die Zukunftsperspektive mit einschliesst und den Begriff «Fernstenliebe» überflüssig macht.

1. Introducción a la ciencia del derecho natural.

According to Rettler, there are three types of control that we should consider in relation to the legitimacy of doxastic blame: Intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based control. Rettler argues that among these, influence-based control is the only type of control that is necessary and sufficient for fulfilling the control con-dition required for legitimate doxastic blame. The aim of this short discussion paper is to critically assess Rettler’s view of doxastic con-trol. By doing so, I attempt to defend the reason-responsiveness view from (...) Rettler’s criticism and cast doubt on whether influence-based control has a positive epistemic influence on beliefs. (shrink)

Richard Nisbett's The Geography of Thought is one of several recent works that have highlighted purported differences in thinking patterns between East Asians and Westerners on the basis of empirical research. This has implications for teaching and for other issues such as cultural integration. Based on a framework consisting of three distinct notions of rationality, this paper argues that some of the differences alleged by Nisbett are either not real or exaggerated, and that his geography of thought fails to provide (...) an adequate account of thinking styles across cultures. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for teaching and learning critical thinking that can be drawn from the framework developed. (shrink)

The structure of pluralist arguments -- The inadequacy of multiculturalism -- The incompatibility of subsidiarity -- Associative democracy and the corporatist temptation -- Two conceptions of sovereignty -- A positivist pluralism? -- Law as intelligibility -- Pluralist authority -- This unity of life and action -- The personality of associations -- Property, personality, and public justification -- The spectre of intractability.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between organizational ethical context and the individual ethical decision-making process. In addition, a new statistical approach combining cluster and discriminant analyses was developed to overcome violations of regression assumptions, which are commonly not identified and/or ignored in behavioral and psychological research. Using regressions and this new alternative method, the findings indicated that ethical context does indeed influence the various components of ethical reasoning. However, social desirability was the strongest predictor of (...) ethical decision making, which raises new concerns about how this bias can confound business ethics research. Finally, the findings showed that the alternative method provided more useful and interpretive results, indicating that it has the capacity to influence future empirical work in the field of business ethics, particularly when dealing with data that do not satisfy regression assumptions. The implications and limitations of the study are discussed, and several noteworthy suggestions for future research are provided. (shrink)

According to two-dimensional semantics, primary intension and secondary intension can play the role of reflecting the cognitive aspect of an expression like Fregean sense does. The aim of this paper is to argue that this role is likely a myth. To argue for this, I attempt to show that cognitive aspects of fictional names cannot be explained within the framework of two-dimensional semantics. To be more specific, I consider four ontological theories about fictional characters that two-dimensional semanticists might be tempted (...) to choose. And then, I argue that none of them can be combined with two-dimensional semantics in a satisfactory way. (shrink)

This paper will describe the rite for the exorcism of toch'aebi and examine its symbolic significance in the wider social reality of Cheju shamanism. Toch'aebi is a stranger deity who visits Cheju randomly and tries to get on good terms with the people. However, this deity afflicts people, particularly women, wearing down their vitality and causing a kind of “madness” (turida). The exorcism ritual of toch'aebi requires a sacrificial feast of roast pig and several days of dancing by the possessed. (...) For this reason, the exorcism ritual is called a dancing rite, or ch'unun kut. It is supposedly toch'aebi himself who has the desire to dance. Shaman's songs (seouje sori) are used to induce the toch'aebi, who is hiding in the patient's body, to dance and reveal his identity. The trance dance and singing are directed toward a dialogical construction of the demonic reality, which entails a romantic entanglement of toch'aebi and the possessed. By translating a history of personal suffering into the idiom of love, the shaman's songs develop a particular cultural logic of cure. Through an analysis of curing song texts, along with various modes of performance such as dance and comic play, this paper explores the transformative process in which a particular cultural logic of illness and cure are produced and enacted to reintegrate the patient into the social world. In practice, the analysis addresses the articulation of a personal case of madness that afflicted Sunho, a twenty-one year old female factory worker, whose social values and understanding are reflective of contemporary Korea. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that we can understand how original intentionality (i.e., a genuine mental life) fits into a natural and scientific understanding of the world through an understanding of the import of the intentionality of emotions to our knowledge of the world in which we live. To do so, I first argue that emotions demonstrate our original intentionality (i.e., a genuine mental life). I then explain how the intentionality of emotions is necessary for us to have knowledge of (...) the world in virtue of our emotional responses. I conclude with a brief discussion of how the neuroscience of emotion can help to provide an explanation of how we can know in virtue of our emotional experiences—how epistemology can be naturalized via emotions. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize it as an emotion of global negative self‐assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self‐evaluation. According to nonstandard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self‐assessment. I argue here in favor of nonstandard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor's standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper's experience (...) of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor's account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences. (shrink)